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In

The Supreme Gourt
of the

State of Utah
J. L. GIBSON,
Plaintiff,
vs.
UTAH STATE TEACHERS' RETIREMENT BOARD, LEROY E. COWLES,
CHARLES H. SKIDMORE, .JOSEPH
CIIEZ, ALEX JEX, M I L T 0 N B.
TAYLOR, D. A. WOOTTON, and J. R.
SMITH~ Members Thereof,
Defendants.

DEFENDANTS' BRIEF
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiff, for the past thirty-four years,
has been and is now employed as a teacher by the
That
public schools of the State of Utah.
'plaintiff has been for many years .and is now
Dean of the School of Arts and SCiences and Professor of Mathematics at the University of Utah.
That on or about the 1st day of Novembflr,
1923,
plaintiff
the provided
holder
a of Museum
retirement
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tannuity contract with the Teachers' Insurance &
Annuity Association of America. That from the 1st
day of November, 1923, and up to the 29th day of
December, 1937, the University of Utah contributed
and paid one-half of the premiums ( $180.00 a year
for fourteen years and two months) on said contract
in the total amount of Two Thousand Five Hundred Fifty ($2,550.00) Dollars. That the plaintiff
and the University of Utah, at the request of the
plaintiff, discontinued the payment of premiums on
said contract after the said payment of December
29, 1937.
That the said contract of plaintiff with the
Teachers' Insurance & Annuity Association of
America is not subject to cancellation or forfeiturP.
\by failure of the insured to pay the premiums thereon. That the annuity under the contract is payable
to the annuitant personally as long as he shall live,
:and at his demise to his heirs. That the policy is
not assignable by the annuitant. That the plai.n;tiff is the owner and holder of said contract ttnd
entitled to all benefits accruing thereunder notwitb·standing the cessation of premium payments.
That on or about the 21st day of March, 19~8,
,plaintiff made and filed an application with the
'Retirement Board for membership in the Utah:
State Teachers' Retirement System pursuant to
the provisjons of Chapter 85, Session Laws of Utah,
1937. That a hearing on said application was had
on the 18th day of April, 1938. That at said hearing plaintiff appeared in person and by J. Lambert
Gibson, his attorney. That the Retirement Board,
being the identical persons named as defendants
above, after hearing and receiving the evidence introduced by the applicant (plaintiff above), duly
made in writing its Findings of Fact and Conclu·
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sions of Law and Decision, whereby the said Retirement Board found and decided that the applicant
{plaintiff above) was not eligible for membership
in the Utah State Teachers' Retirement System.
The plaintiff, not being satisfied with the decision of the Retirement Board rejecting his application for membership, on the 19th day of April,
1939 instituted an action in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, Utah, for
a declaratory judgment, wherein the identical parties above named were made defendants and wherein the identical claims of the plaintiff against the
defendants were tried and determined by said court,
and on the 15th day of June, 1939, the said Distrjct
Court made and entered its decree dismissing the
petition of plaintiff. That no appeal was ever' taken
from said decree and ever since its rendition and
entry has been and is now in full force and effect.

ARGUMENT
Plaintiff on page six of his brief says: ''This
is an action by the plaintiff against the defendants
to force them to accept the plaintiff as a member
of said system . . . '' ·While in truth and fact
it is not an action to force anybody o·r anything but
merely a proceeding pursuant to the issuance of a
Writ of Certioari by this Court to review the rec·
ord of proceedings of the Retirement Board in the
matter of the application of the plaintiff for membership in the Utah State 'reachers' Retirement
System to determine from the face of the record
whether the Retirement Board has exceeded its
jurisdiction or has not proceeded according to thP
ossential
requirements of the law. The jurisdiction
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of the Retirement Board and the procedure it must
follow are defined in the law.
Chapter 85, Session Laws of Utah, 1937.
Section 104-67-8, R. S. 1933, relating to the
·Writ of Certiorari, provides:
''The review upon this writ cannot be extended further than to determine whether
the inferior tribunal, Board or officer ha~
regularly pursued the authority of such
tribunal, board or officer.''
The great weight of .authority in this country
is to the effect that under statutes such as ours a
Writ of Review will extend no farther than to determine whether the inferior court or tribunal has
exceeded its jurisdiction either by want of having
acquired jurisdiction of the parties or not havingacquired jurisdiction of the subject matter, and does
not authorize the Supreme Court to review the judgment or record for irregularities or errors committed within the jurisdiction.
Pintock v. Kimball, District Judge, 64
Utah 4; 228 P. 221.
Batley v. Ritchie, 73 Utah 320; 273 P. 969.
University of Utah v. Industrial Com., 64
Utah 273; 229 P. 1103.
Ba.ge v. Com. Nat'l Bk, 38 Utah 440; 112
P. 816.
The Utah State Teachers' Retirement System
·was created by Chapter 85, Session La.ws of Utah,
1937, and by Section 3 is designated the "Teachers'
Retirement Act.''
Section 3, (3) of the Act provides:
'' 'Teacher' shall mean any person who is
serving under a legal certificate as a legally
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qualified teacher in a public day or evening
school or as a superintendent, or supervising executive, or educational administrator of public schools, or librarian and
shall include teachers with and without a
certificate who are employed by any State
educational institution supported and controlled by the State, and persons with or
without a certificate who are employed on
the staff of the State superintendent of
public instruction to render service of an
educational nature. In all cases of doubt
tJ: e retirement board hereinafter created
shall determine whether any person IS a
teacher as defined in this act. ''
Section 3, (4):
" '~[ember' shall mean any person included
in the membership of the system as provided in Sections 11 and 13 of this act.''
Section 8 creates the Retirement Board, and in
part provides :
''The retirement system shall be managed
exclusively by a retirement board hereby
created, . . . Said board shall choose one
of its members as president, and shall employ a secretary and consulting actuary ,and
such clerical and other assistance as may
be necessary . . .
''The Retirement Board ~hall have the sole
power and authority to hear and dete.rmine
all facts pertaining to applications for benefits under the retirement system and all
matters pertaining to the administration
thereof . . . ''
Section 9 provides :
''The retirement board shall exercise the
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powers and perform the duties conferred
on it by this act, and in addition thereto:
(e) Shall determine the service rendered
by members in the status requisite to membership herein to be credited toward qualification for retirement and shall fix retire_
ment allowances . . . ''
:Section 10 provides :
"A fund is hereby created to be designated
as the Utah State Teachers' Retirement
fund . . . The retirement board shall have
exclusive control of the administration and
investment of said fund . . . ''
Section 11 provides.:
'' vVi th the exception of those teachers who
are excluded from membership by the provisions of Section 12 hereof, all teachers
shall become members of the retirement
system as follows :
'' (a) Every teacher who is employed in
the public schools of this State on July 1,
1937 shall become a teacher of the retirement system on that date."
'Section 12 provides :
The following teachers shall be excluded
from membership in the retirement system:
(b) Every teacher who is the holder of a
retirement ·annuity contract with the
Teachers' Insurance & Annuity Association
of America or with anv other private organization or company,~ in which the State
of Utah, or any subdivision thereof contributes part of the premium, under said
contract; provided~ however, that every
such teacher, upon ceasing to be a holder
of such contract and being otherwise
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eligible to membership in this system, shall
forthwith become a member of the system."
Section 4 provides :

''An applicant for a benefit hereunder shall
have the right to demand a hearing before
the board and shall huve the right to
appear personally and he represented by
counsel or by a friend. Any applicant may
file an application for rehearing of any
applieation, whether for a benefit hereunder or retirement, 'within thirty days.
after written notice of the de-termination
by the retirement board has been sent by
registered mail to the applicant or his
attorney of record, upon any of the following grounds :
"(a) That the board acted without and in
excess of its powers.
"(b) That the order, division or award
was procured by fraud.
'• (c) That the evidence does not justify .
the determination of the board.
" (d) That the applicant has discovered
new evidence rna te·rial to him which he
could not, with reasonable diligence, have
discovered or procured at the hearing.
"The determiation of the retirement board
on any application for rehearing shall be
made within one hundred eighty days after
the filing thereof, or said application shall
be deemed denied and such determination
shall be final and conclusive and it shall
have no jurisdiction to entertain any subSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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sequent application regarding the same
matter.''
Section 21 provides :
'' . . . For the purpose of this section, the
holder of a retirement annuity contract
with the Teachers' Insurance & Annuity
Association of America or with any other
private organization or company, in which
the State of Utah, or any subdivision thereof contributes part of the premium under
said contract, shall be considered permanent separation from service in status
requisite to membership 'herein. . . . ''
Under the law there is no question as to thE'
creation of the retirement system and the Retirement Board and the powers of the board. The only
questions therefore to be considered by this Court
are whether the Retirement Board acquired jurisdiction of the person of the plaintiff and had jurisdiction of the subject matter. The record of the
proceedings had before the Retirement Board show
that the plaintiff filed his application for membership; that the application disclosed he was a holder
of a contract with the Teachers' Insurance & Annuity Association of America; that a hearing on
his application before the Retirement Board was
duly set, noticed and held; that the plaintiff personally appeared at said hearing and offered evidence and was also represented by couns.el; that the
Retirement Board took the matter under advisement
and thereafter made findings of fact and conclusions of law and rendered a decision rejecting the
!application of the plaintiff; ·and that notice of the
decision was duly served on the plaintiff. The
plaintiff having personally submitted to the jurisdiction of the Retiren1ent Board and the law giving
it power to determine the matter of his eligibility
to membership, it is dPfinitely and conclm:;ively
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established, it seems to us, that the Retirement
Board acquired jurisdiction of the person of the
plaintiff and had jurisdiction of the subject matter
of the controversy.
The plaintiff takes the position that he automatically became a member of the Retirement System and that the Retirement Board had no right,
power or jurisdiction to determine his eligibility for
membership. A mere cursory reading of the law
will convince anyone that such a position is untenable. If true, then the legislative enactment investing the Retirement Board with power to determine in all cases of doubt whether a person is
a teacher as defined in the act is meaningless. By
that enactment the legislature recognized the fact
-that there would be questions on the eligibility of
some teachers requiring investigation, hearing and
determination, and, therefore, gave the Retirement
Board power to investigate, hear and determine
those questions. By the provisions of Section 12
of the act certain teachers are excluded from membership. The question of whether or not a teacher
comes within the excluded class must be determined
by the Retirement Board. Any teacher claiming
he is not within the excluded class must bear the
burden of proving it. The plaintiff has not donP
so.
The plaintiff further contends that there is no
provision in the act which authorizes a hearing by
the Retirement Board to determine membership.
When you consider that memb1:l'rship is the vital
thing called "The life of the retirement system''
and that all the benefits afforded by the benevolent
provisions of the act flow only from membership,
it is most eminently clear that the legislature intended that the doors to the retirement benefits
could not automatically open to every teacher, and
wasFunding
careful
to provided
provide
that
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''In all cases of doubt the Retirement Board
shall determine whether any person is a
teacher as defined in the Act. ''
The word '' teacher '' therefore, as used in the
Act, is synonymous with the word "member,"
for only teachers coming within the provisions of
the act are entitled to membership. Subdivision 4
of Section 3. Without any other delegation of
power to the Retirement Board the absolute power
given to determine whether any person, is. a teacher
as defined in the Act unequivocally authorizes the
Retirement Board to hear and decide· all questions
relating to eligibility for membership. But, coupled
with that power are the powers given to the Retirement Board by Section 4 of the Act above quoted.
Plaintiff claims that that part of Section 4 reading
"An applicant for a benefit hereunder shall have
the right to demand a hearing before the Board and
~hall have the right to appear personally and be
represented by counsel or by a friend,'' does not
apply to an application for membership, becam::e,
be says, benefits come afterwards.
How plain this contention makes plaintiff's
position, namely: "If I can slide through the gates
of me·mbership I am assured all the benefits of thP.
act.'' Without membership there can be no ben~fits. An application for membership therefore· includes all benefits, and after membership granted
it is only a matter of when a member snail r~ceive
and enjoy his benefits, and he makes thai known
by applying for his earned benefits. A hearing on
that application is also provided for in said Section 4. ·we contend that the provisions of said Section 4 are not limited to applications for earned
benefits arising after membership. The section in
part Rays that ''Any applicant may file an application for rehearing of any application, whether for
a benefit hereunder or retirem~nt." Significance
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must be given to the broad language: ''Any application, whether for a benefit hereunder or retirement.'' Certainly an application for membership
is an application filed pursuant to the terms of the
act and is for all the benefits .afforded by the act.
The plaintiff says in his brief that he filed his application for membership pursuant to the provisions
of the act. At any rate, the Retirement Board under
its unquestioned power to determine whether any
person is a teacher followed the procedure outlined
in Section 4 relating to plaintiff's application for
membership, and the plaintiff made no objection
thereto but appeared in person and testified and
offered evidence, and failed to filP- an application
for rehearing on any of the broad grounds specified
in the act, or at all.
The plaintiff further contends that the Retirement Board has no authority to hold a judicial heari:!lg and that the Board is not a quasi-judicial body
because the act does not -provide for such a hearing. The express provisions of the act negative
such contention. Section 3 (3) gives the Board
power to determine whether any person is a teacher,
and Section 8 gives the Board the sole power and
authority to hear and determine all facts pertaining to applications for benefits under the retirement system and all matters pertaining to the administration thereof. A reference to these legislative powers alone would seem to establish conclusively that the contention of plaintiff is not sustainable. The wo:rd '~determine" has been judi-.
rially defined to mean: ''To settle by authoritative
or judicial sentence;" "To ascertain or state definitely;" "To perform a judicial act;'' and "To
adjudge.''
18Quinney
c. Law
J. Library.
985,Funding
86. for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Sponsored by the S.J.
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The term "Judicial Act" has been defined.. as follows:
''An act is judicial when it requires the
exercise of judgment or discretion by one
or more persons when acting as public
officers in an official character, in a manner which se,ems to them just and equitable.''
34 C. J. 1178, Note 33.
''An act done by a member of the judicial
department of government in construing
the law or applying it to a state of facts
presented for the determination of the
rights of the parties thereunder.''
34 c. J. 1181.
Plaintiff undoubtedly is right when he says
that the Retirement Board does not have power to
hold a purely judicial hearing. The judicial power
in its fullest extent belongs, of course, to the judicial department or the courts, not to boards or
officers. But, we have in Utah a number of boards
exercising quasi-judicial powers and the Teachers'
Retirement Board is one of them. A quasi-judicial
power is one imposed upon an officer or board in-volving the exercise of discretion, judicial tin its
nature, in connection with, and as incidental to, the
administration of matters assigned to or entrusted
to said officer or board.
34 C. J. 1180, Note 72.
Quasi-judicial powers involving judgment and discretion are often, and must necessarily be exercised
by administrative and executive bodies and officers.
34 C. J. 1180, Note 72.
If such were not the case then the Retirement Board
could not determine or render a decision as to
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whether a person is a teacher and could not hear
and detennine ~ll facts pertaining to applications,
and consequently would be a dummy, instead of an
active body determining facts and rendering decisions in accordance with and within the orbits of
the powers gi.Yen it and in accordance with the
obligations imposed upon it and entrusted to it by
the law. The Retirement Board has power to hear
and determine certain matters as does the Industrial Commission of Utah. This Court has many
times held that the Industrial Commission is a
quasi-judicial body.
University of Utah v. Ind. Com., 64 Utah
273, 76; 229 P. 1103,
this Court, in speaking of the Industrial Commi ssion said:
''The Industrial C01nmission is a tribunal
of limited authority. Its power in any case
must be found in express law or necessary
inference therefrom.''

In
Industrial Commission v. Evans, 52 Utah
394, 405; 174 P. 825,
this Court, among other things, said:
''No doubt the Commission may, under
certain circumstances, hear evidence and
may determine the facts and apply the law
to them when found . . . ''

In
Utah Fuel Company v. Ind. Com.. 57 Utah
246-51; 194 P. 122, this Court said:
''Every administrative body, if it is to
function at all, must have soine power and
jurisdiction to determine for itself whether
or not it may proceed in a given case, and
this we think may be done without usurping
the functions of the Court, so long as it
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

14

does not act arbitrarily or in excess of the
express powers conferred by legislative
enactment.''
In
Continental Casualty Co. v. Ind. Com., 61
Utah 16-20; 210 P.127, this Court said:
'' The Industrial Commission of this State
is an administrative body. Some of its
acts, in fact many of its acts, are quasijudicial . . . ''
In
D. & R. G. W. RR. Co. v. Ind. Com., 74
Utah 316-20; 279 P. 612, this Court
said:
'' vVben the Industrial Commission hears
and determines an application for an award
of compens,ation, it exercises quasi-judicial
functions. Its awards are in effect judgments."
The Retirement Board occupies a like status
with the Industrial Commission and has power to
hear controversies, find facts and apply the law
to the facts in all matters coming within the express
powers given to it by the legislature and those necesarily inferred therefrom. In the instant case' the
plaintiff made application for membershjp in the
retirement system and therein disclosed that he
was a holder of a contract with the Teachers' Insurance & Annuity Association of America. A
hearing was had on that application at which the
plaintiff appeared in person and by counsel and
testified and offered in evidence his said contract.
From the testimonv and evidence the Retirement
Board found as fa~ts that the plaintiff was employed by the University of Utah; that he ente,red
into a contract with the Teachers' Insurance &
nuity Association of America; that the contract reSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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qui red the payment of regular monthly premiums;
that the contract '"as not subject to forfeiture because of the failure to pay premiums, but upon
failure to pay any regular monthly premium the
policy would automatically become fully paid up for
an annuity payable as the orig-inal annuity was payable, but for a reduced amount; that the contraCJt
could be reinstated to its original status. at any
time, upon payment of the delinquencies ; that all
premiums due under the said contract were paid by
the plaintiff and the University of Utah from November 1, 1923 to December 29, 1937; that the plaintiff and the University ceased making premium payments after the payment of December 29, 1937; and
that the plaintiff retained said contract so as to
claim and receive the deferred annuity provided
therein on the basis of the contributions made to
December 29, 1937; and then the Retirement Board
made conclusions of law, or applied the law, to those
facts and rendered a decision denying the application of p1aintiff for membership. All, we clairr1)
within the powers and jurisdiction of the Retirement
Board under the laws hereinbefore quoted and
found in
Chapter 85, Session Laws of Utah 1937.
The plaintiff takes the position that the Retirement Board was without power to ascertain or
construe the contents of the contract with the
Teachers' Insurance & Annuity Association of
America and relies upon Continental Gas Co. v.
Ind. Com., 61 Utah 16; 210 P. 127. A mere casual
reading of the case shows conclusively that the
facts are wholly dissimilar to the facts in the instant case. In that case a man lost his life as the
result of an accident. An award was made by the
Industrial Commission and the Continental Cas...
n::llty Company questioned the power of the CommiRRion
toLawrequire
to pay
the
award
onandthe
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grounds that the policy issued by it insured the
Elaterite Varnish & Rubber Company; tl-utt the
n1ine in which the deceased was working was operated hy one R. M. Pope under a contract with the
rubber company, and that the deceased was an em_
ployee of Mr. Pope at the time of the accident. The
Court said: "Such being the admitted facts, could
the Industrial Commission disregard the wording
of the policy that it insured employe,es of the rubber company and make an award for an employee
of one not named in the policy~" Clearly it could
;not, and the the Court so held, saying: "It is not
'Ve·sted with power to reform a contract or make a
new contract to conform with the intent of the parties. That power belongs to another forum."
There is no objection on our part to that decision,
but it has no application to plaintiff's case and
does not act to deprive the Teachers' Retirement
Board of power to apply the law to facts as found
hy it in cases within its jurisdiction. Answeringthe first point raised by the Continental Casualty
Company in that case, this Court said:
''The question of dependency being admitted, the issuance and delivery of the
policy also being admitted, and the accident happening within the time covered by
the policy, the Industrial Commission was
without authority to determine or hold
that its terms were not in force and binding upon the casualty company at the time
of the accident. . . . The policy was. hefore the Commission. The Commission
had no power to do othe·rwise than to enforce- and to apply its terms as the same
appear in the policy.''
This ruling shows conclusively that the Com'mission had power to read, study and construe· policies of in~unuwe affrctin~· employees within its
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jurisdiction and to enforce the terms of those policies. That is just what the Teachers' Retirement
Board did in Mr. Gibson's case. The Teachers'
Retirement Act requires the Board to examine the
policies issued by the Teachers' Insurance & Annuity Association of America and determine from
their terms whether or not a teacher is a holder
of such a policy. The Retirement Board did it,
found the facts and applied the law.

TEACHERS EXCLUDED
The construction given to Section 12 of the
Retirement Act by the Retirement Board, whereby
certain teachers are excluded from membership is
correct, we believe. Subdivision (b) creates three
definite situations of exclusion, namely:

1.
Every teacher who is the holder of a retirement annuity contract with the Teachers' Insurance & Annuity Association of America.

2.
Or (the word "or'' being an alternative and
being used as a conjunction marking an alternative
and not joining, uniting- or connecting several words·
or phrases of the same class) with any other private organization or company~ in which the State
of Utah, or any suhdivision thereof, contributes
part of the premium, under said contract.

3.
Provided, however, that ever1J such teacher,
upon ceasing to be a holder of such contract and
being otherwiRe eligible to membership in this sysSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tern, shall forthwith become a member of the
system.
Under the first situation no one will gainsay
that the plaintiff was a holder of such a contract
at the time the Retirement Act took effect, namely,
March 3, 1937, and that he remained a full-fledged
holder by the joint payment of premiums by himself and the University of Utah until Dec-ember 29,
1937, when payment of premiums were discontinued.
It is absolutely certain that he was ineligible during
all of that time, and when you consider the provisions of Section 21 of the act relating to termination of membership, is it not equally certain that
l1e became permanently ineligible by being the
holder of a contract with the Teachers' Insurance
& Annuity Association of America after the rreachers' Retirement Act became effective~ That part
of Section 21 applicable here is the part heretoforP
quoted in this brief.
This quoted part of Section 21 means, if it
means anything at all, that the holding or owning
of a contract with the Teachers' Insurance: & Annuity Association of America is tantamount to
permanent separation from service, and certainly
one separated permanently from service is not entitled to membership. It will be noted that the law
does not declare that the geparation from service
is contingent or shall endure only while the State
or some subdivision thereof contributes part of the
premium, hut states in unequivocal manda.tory
terms that the separation shall be permanent, and,
therefore, the words ''In which the State of Utah
or any subdivision thereof contributes a part of thP
premium'' are only descriptive of a situation or a
status. The plaintiff, therefore, at the time the
law took effect was in the status of those teachers
permanently separated from the service, and,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

19
under the law, was not a teacher qualified for membership. It will be here remembered that the law
gives the Retirement Board power to determine in
all cases of doubt whether any person is a teacher
as defined in the act.
With the second situation we are not concerned
unless it be determined that the words. "in which
the State of Utah or any subdivision thereof contributes a part of the premium, under said contract'' relate back to and must be deemed a part of
the first situation. We do not believe that such is
1:he case, as the two situations are not connected
with a copulative- conjunction, as plaintiff eontends, but with a conjunction expressing an alternative. But. for the sake of argument, assume that
plaintiff's contention is correct, then it would
seem that the proviso following the second situation goes right through everythinng preceding it and
modifies both the first and second situations with
all that it means. If it does not, then the first situation stands alone and is a complete bar to the
contention of plaintiff. It is a rule of statutory consb11ction that a proviso should be confined to the
antecedent next preceding it unless a contrary contention clearly appears.
State v. Quale, 26 Utah 26-30; 71 P. 1060.
Under this rule the antecedent of the terms ''every
such teacher" found in the proviso would be limited to the teachers named in the second situation.
But in
Meat Co. v. Mining Co., 36 Utah 145; 103
P. 254,
this Court laid down and applied the rule:
''That what is termed a proviso is not
really such, if not restricting or modifying·
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but being intended to apply to the whole
chapter, so that for the purpose of arriving
at the true intention such proviso should
be considered as a separate section, the
mere fact of it being termed a proviso and
appended to a particular section not being
controlling.''
Under this rule it would seem that the term "every
such teacher'' was intended to apply to all of Subsection (b) of said Section 12 of the act.
The question therefore is ''when does a teacher
cease to be a holder of such a contract~)' The answer to that question can be found only in the contract itself. As found by the Retirement Board,
the contract cannot be forfeited, cancelled or
assigned. The discontinuance of payments of
premiums does riot forfeit or cancel the contract,
but on the contrary, causes the contract to automatically become paid up for an annuity payable
as the original annuity was .Payable, except for
such reduced monthly amount as the premium
thereon will purchase. Under such circumstancef:l
how can the plaintiff successfully claim that he has
ceased to be the holder of the contract. He will and
must receive the reduced annuity by reason of the
contract. As long as a pe·rson is receiving benefits
issuing from a contract, and that contract is the
very foundation of those benefits, the contract is
not v,riped out and does not cease to exist, and he is
still the holder of it. Such is. fundamentally,
logically and indisputably true. In
32 C. J. 1300, Section 530, it is said:
''Failure or default in the payment of
premiums . . . does not, in the absence of
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a contractual proVISIOn, avoid or forfeit
the policy of insurance. ''
That rule applies here ·and is a complete answer to the contention of plaintiff. The contractual
provisions of the contract in question are all against
avoidance, forfeiture, cancellation and assignment.
Again the words "in which the State of Utah, or
any subdivision thereof, contributes a part of the
premium,'' if they actually modify the first situation, are merely descriptive of a class of ineligible
teachers and do not limit or abridge the meaning
of the term ''upon ceasing to be a holder of such
contract.'' This is true because any teacher holding a contract with the Teachers' Insurance & Annuity Association of America to which the State
of Utah, or any subdivision thereof, was not contributing or had not contributed any part of the
premium would not be ineligible.
Plaintiff further contends that because the
term "to which the State of Utah, or any subdivision thereof, is contributing a part of the
J··remium" is in the present tense, that a mere discontinuance of the payment of the premiums on the
contract would make him eligible. If the phrase
is merely descriptive of a class of ineligible teachers, then its tense is immaterial. ·We must assume
that the legislature in enacting this exclusion statute knew that the State of Utah had contributed
out of the appropriations made by it to the University of Utah large sums of money for the special
benefit of certain teachers, and that those teachers
were the ones holding contracts with the Teach0rs' Insurance- & Annuity Association of America.
We must also assume that when the legilature enrtcted that part of the Teachers' Retirement Act
relating to credit for prior service, Section 9 (e),
it knew of the contributions made by it to teachers
contracts
with
the Teachers'
Insurance
& Services
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Annuity Association of America and that it the·refore excluded those teachers who were the beneficiaries of those contributions, and, because the State
of Utah was then contributing and the premiums
were payable monthly in advance, the language
used was necessarily in the present tense. This intention is fortified when you consider that the
University of Utah paid one-half of the premiums
on plaintiff's policy, or One Hundred Eighty
($180) Dollars a year for fourteen years and two
months, or a total of Two Thousand Five Hundred
Fifty ($2,550) Dollars. To let such a holder of a
contract where the State, through the university,
has contributed such a large part of the consideration, assuring such a holder a double annuity at
the expense of the State, come into the Utah State
Teachers' Retirement System would be in violation
of the very spirit and wording of the law, and would
work a great injustice on those teachers who have
not been so favored by the State, especially in those
cases (such as the plaintiff's) where many years of
credit for prior service follows membership. As
found by the Re·tirement Board, under the provisions in the plaintiff's policy with the Teachers'
Tn;;;;nrance & Annuity Association of America, the
policy is t•Ubject to reinstatement at any time. It
seems certain that plaintiff, after acquiring membership in the Utah State Teachers' Retirement
System, would immediately reinstate his contract,
and thus he would obtain indirectly that which he
is prevented from having directly, namely, membership in the Utah State Teachers' Retirement System while still a holder of a policy of insurance
with that association, on which the State has ·paid
one-half of the premiums, and entitled to many
years' credit for prior service toward qualification
for retirement in the Rtate association. vVe do not
believe the legislature under the wording of the
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law intended to give him both the premiums on the
policy with the Teachers' Insurance & Annuity
Association of America, assuring him a double annuity at the expense of the State, :and the large
credit for service in the State system, the legislature undoubtedly knowing and believing that the
large amount paid by the university for the ben€fit of the insured could not be recovered back
and the insured could not be deprived of the benefits thereof.
Plaintiff says in his brief that he has done
everything that it is possible for him to do to dispossess himself of the contract. All he has done
is to discontinue payments of premium and that
does not dispossess him of it. It stands to rea:son
that he will not dispossess himself of the benefitH
to be derived from that contract. He cannot do
so because the annuity therein provided must be
paid to the annuitant and not to his assignees. The
Retirement Board found that he had discontinued
premium payments but that he had retained said
contract so as to claim and receive the deferred
annuity provided therein.
Plaintiff states on pag·e 14 of his brief that
the amount to which he would be entitled from the
Utah State Teachers' R:etirement System is determined by the years of prior sevice and that
the years of prior service are de,termined
not by the number of years which he has been a
teacher, but by the number of years which he has
been a teacher and not the holder of a retirement
annuity contract with the Teachers' Insuranee &
Annuity Association of America in which the State
of Utah contributed a part of the premiums. \Ve
submit that there is no provision in the law so declaring. If the legislature so intended, then it
would not have excluded the holders of those conSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tracts from membership, but would have declared
that they were entitled to membership but could
not have credit for the time they were holders of
such contracts.

CONSTITUTIONALITY
Plaintiff devotes a good part of his brief, pages
1.6, 17, 18 and 19, to an attack on the constitutionality of the Teachers' Retirement Act, and this notwithstanding he is claiming membership in the Utah
State Teachers' Retirement System and all the benefits issuing from it under the law. It is a universally established rule of law that a party cannot
assert a right under a statute and at the same time
question its constitutionality.
Leva v. Utah Fuel Co., 58 Utah 388; 199
P. 659.
Further, a petition for a Writ of Certiorari must
contain an assignment of errors relied upon. Matters not assigned as errors will not be reviewed.
11 C. J. 151, Sec. 150.
Griffiths v. Justice's Court, 35 Utah 443-54;
100 P. 1064.
The soundness of the two foregoing rules is glaringly apparent. The plaintiff in his application for
the writ of certiorari does not re,ly, naturally, upon
the unconstitutionality of the Act, and there is no
assignment of error relating the·reto in his application. At no time has he ever presented tlie question
PXCept in his brief to this Court. It appears that
the plaintiff suddenly determined that lf he could
not get what he wanted out of the retirement act
he would see to it that no one· else got anything
But, such a coveted malign achievement is not open
to him. It is further a universal rule that every
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

25

presumption will be indulged in favor of the constitutionality of a statute.
Tintic Standard Mining Co. v. Utah
County, SO Utah -!91; 15 P. (2d) 633.

DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
The record before the Court shows that on
the 19th day of April, 1939 the plaintiff petitioned
the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt
Lake County, Utah, for a declaratory judgment,
involving the identical questions raised and argued
by him in his petition for Writ of Certiorari issued
by this Court, and in his brief filed herein in support of his petition, and wherein the identical persons were defendants. After hearing the cause on
the merits the Court rendered its decision dismisSing the petition of plaintiff. No appeal was taken
from that judgment. We contend that that judgment disposes of the very issues presented hy the
plaintiff in this review and i~ binding on the plaintiff and on this Court. The plaintiff s,tates in his
brief that the case was dismissed at the request
of the defendants on the ground that the court was
without jurisdiction. There is nothing in the record to so show or in the decision rendered bv the
court. The decision speaks for itself and sho~s on
its face that the case was tried on its merlts. Declaratory judgments have the force and effect of
a final judgment or decree.
Section 104-64-1, Revised Statutes. 1933.
A judgment dismissing a complaint is final if it
<·xpress.ly declares or if it appears by the judgment
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roll that the judgment was rendered upon the
merits.
Section 104-30-7.
P~aintiff 's remarks (page 20 of his brief) concerning the findings of fact and conclusions of law
made and filed by the Retirement Board are not
only immaterial but wholly untrue. The certified
.record to this Court shows the date on which they
were made and filed and that record imports
verity.

LACHES
In answer to defendants' charge of laches the
plaintiff says on page twenty-one of his brief, in
substance, that under the law he was a member of
the retirement system and as such he was not required to do or cause the courts to do anything in
reg1ard to said system until he applied for benefits,
which, he says, he has not done. Yet, he is the
moving spirit in this attempted review, and on page
six of his brief he says, in substance, that his application for the ·Writ of Review is an action brought
by him against the defendants to force them to
accept the plaintiff as a member of the retirement
sys,tem and to do for him the acts required of them
by the retire·ment act. It is plain that neither
statement is true, and such expressions by the
plaintiff are wholly irrelevant to the question of
laches.
While Section 104-67-2 states that the Writ of
Certiorari may issue at any time after judgment,
.still there ought to be a time when a party through
hie negligence or laches should be denied the writ.
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ed on the 4th day of :May, 1938, and became final
on the 7th day of June, 1938. The applicant, instead of applying to this Court or to the District
.Court for a \Yrit of Certiorari, filed au action in the
~ehird Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake
County, Utah, against the identical defendants O!.l
the 19th day of April, 1939., for a declaratory judgment. He remained silent and inert for ten months
and ten days before going to the District Court for
said declaratory judgment. Having lost in that
action on the 15th day of June, 1939, he remained
silent and inert until the 24th day of January,
1940, when he filed his application with this Court
for a \Y rit of Certiorari. He failed and neglected
to apply to this Court for a Writ of D~rtiorari for
one year, seven months and seventeen days after
the judgment of the Retirement Board became final.

In
State Ex rel Tumwater P. & W. Co. v.
Superior Court, 105 P. 815,
the Supreme Court of Washington ruled:
"While the statute fixes no time within
which a ·Writ of Review must he applied
for, we have held by analogy that the writ
must be applied for within the time fixed
for taking an appeal." (Citing cases).
To the same effect is
State v. Kuykendale, 236 P. 99 (Wash.)
The Supreme Court of Idaho said, in
case of

th~?

Pullman Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 171 P. 260:
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ecuted. Under the s,tatute an appeal to
the Supreme Court must be taken within
ninety days after the entry of the judgment appealed from. In the absence of a
statute limiting the time within which an
application for Writ of Revie,w may be
prosecuted, the rule is that it must be
applied for within a reasonable time, which
will be deemed to be the time within which
an appeal may be taken in appealable
cases.''
To the same effect is
Smith v. Superior Court of Los Angeles,
32 P. 322' (Calif.)
For the reasons hereinabove expressed, and on
the authorities cited in support thereof, the prayer
of the defendants in their answer to plaintiff's
application for the ·Writ of Certiorari should be
granted.
Very respectfully submitted,
JOSEPH CHEZ,
Attorney General of Utah.
GROVER S. GILES,
Asst. Attorney General of
Utah.
WM. A. IDLTON,
Special Couns.el.
Attorneys for Defendants.
Received typewritten copy of the foregoing
brief this 20th day of March, 1940.
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